

TOPIC SYNOPSIS

Middle-School 1 and 2



Terrorism in Somalia

POSITION PAPERS

Position papers are due by midnight, January 12th. Please send to the email address below. Identify your committee and assignment on the subject line and in the text of the message. Include your position paper as an attachment in .PDF format. If you choose, you can also include it as a Google Doc, but remember go give access to the Secretariat.

The position paper format can be found [HERE](#).

Email your position paper and any questions you might have to:

Middle School 1: whsmunms119@gmail.com

Middle School 2: whsmunms219@gmail.com

IMPORTANT COMMITTEE POLICIES TO BE AWARE OF

- Speaking time for speeches will not be lowered to anything shorter than a minute-thirty seconds. Lowering a speaking time below this does nothing to facilitate debate;
- Comments on speeches cannot be lowered below 30-seconds;
- Moderated caucuses have a set time of 20-minutes. They can be extended for two extra 10-minutes sessions afterward;
- Unmoderated causes can be set for 10, 15, and 20 minutes with one 10-minute extension permitted;
- There is no yielding of speaking time to other delegates;
- No pre-written resolutions will be accepted;
- The use of national flags, pins, or any other national emblem in committee is discouraged, as the United Nations does not allow them either in committee;
- Handouts or briefing sheets are not allowed to be distributed in committee as gives an unfair advantage to delegates who don't have them and is in conflict with the spirit of no pre-written resolutions;
- Computers and phones are not permitted for non-committee related activities such as chatting, gaming, non-conference related web browsing, etc.
- All committee rooms are open to adult advisors including during voting blocs. Student advisors can be kept out during voting blocs;
- Recently, we have discovered that some delegations have been relying on chat groups with adult and student advisors writing speeches and comments for delegates in order to help them with committee awards that they could not on their own. The use of using chat to, in essence, cheat, is prohibited. This does not mean that advisors cannot send general advise to their delegates such as "get yourself on the speaker's list" or "raise your placard more." This is just to keep delegates being fed speeches or comments on information they did not research themselves.

Delegates found to be in violation of these restrictions will lose diplomacy points and may be excluded from any recognition. In addition, they will be reported to their advisors.

I. Background Info:

The al-Shabaab, meaning Youth of the Arabic, emerged as a radical youth jihadist terrorist group centered in Somalia after the fall of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The al-Shabaab began as the militant wing of the ICU but revolted after the United States intervened and placed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in power in December 2006. During the short and unpopular two-year Ethiopian occupation of Somalia, al-Shabaab, the current strongest Islamist militia, had been recognized by the ICU's authority. Numbering near 7,000 to 9,000 militants, al-Shabaab has been banned from the United States and Europe due to their violent traditions and crimes. They have imposed an extremely strict version of Sharia in the southern areas under their control, stoning women accused of adultery and amputating the limbs of thieves. Additionally, the group has claimed responsibility for numerous suicide attacks. They also have connections with militant groups such as the Boko Haram and al-Qaeda. While al-Qaeda does not have much influence within Somalia, they definitely have power within al-Shabaab — who, along with Hisbul Islamiyya (HI), controls most of the land in the nation. Together, in 2009, al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda coordinated and administered terrorist training camps in the south, which reportedly consisted of multiple Western operatives in addition to loyal al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda members.

Recently, the Islamic State has begun competing for al-Shabaab's loyalty, often recruiting dissatisfied al-Shabaab fighters. Following the U.S. attack on Saleh Ali Nabhan of al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab launched a suicide attack that killed seventeen peacekeepers and multiple civilians. Somalia's government has also blamed the group for killing at least 500 people in a truck bombing in Mogadishu in October 2017— the deadliest bombing in East Africa— though al-Shabaab has not claimed responsibility. Currently, there are constant threats of kidnappings

throughout Somalia, especially in regions that border Kenya and Ethiopia. Both terrorists and criminal groups, such as piracy groups, have been involved in hostage-taking in the past.

The terrorist bombings in Somalia are more political than religious. This is because al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda see Uganda as a close ally of the West, whose presence in Somalia would reduce potential expansion. Al-Shabaab uses their religious beliefs as a scapegoat to distract from their violent crimes. Because AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia, began withdrawing their troops this past year, al-Shabaab has been free to reoccupy towns in Somalia. In the past, Somali citizens have had to pay an annual tax directly to the al-Qaeda group, which has initiated terror attacks on U.S. embassies located in Kenya.

Somalia is a relatively unstable Muslim country with no central government and an unguarded coastline, making it easily accessible for transnational terrorist groups. Former al-Shabaab members and the Somali intelligence have stated that the terrorist organization has been extorting thousands of dollars a day through road blocks and taxes on merchants that attempted to transport food and other goods. Somali citizens have fled their homes and live in camps in areas, such as Baidoa. They are funded by the United Nations and men have been issued cash cards. Cash cards have provided them with \$80 to \$90 each month, which enabled them to buy essentials from local merchants. Al-Shabaab soldiers have also occasionally occupied Kenyan villages to deliver sermons, but have left peacefully afterward. The intent of these visits remains unclear, though it is hypothesized that they are done to increase public support of al-Shabaab outside the reach of Kenyan security.

Al-Shabaab's influence in Somalia threatens to overtake that of the United States, which has been protecting the nation from becoming a haven for terrorist groups. The constant threat of terrorist attacks within the nation can potentially destabilize the entirety of the Horn of Africa.

II. UN Involvement:

After the fall of President Siad Barre in the late 1991, much of Somalia was in turmoil. By the early 1990s, the UN had placed much of its focus, resources, and personnel in the country. The United Nations persisted beyond the attacks, and some withdrawal of personnel, and continued to aid Somalia through organizations like the International Committee of Red Cross and other non-governmental organizations. United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar and other international groups like the League of Arab States and Organization of African Unity stressed the need for a peaceful solution. Perez had insisted that restoring peace to Somalia was vital and explained his doubts and plans to the Security Council, encouraging the Secretary of Political Affairs Jonah to visit the area. This visit in January 1992 aimed to bring humanitarian aid to Somali citizens and stop violence in the nation. The aftermath of the visit led to the creation of Resolution 733, in which the Security Council embargoed the shipments of weapons to Somalia, increased humanitarian aid, encouraged an end to the violence through a political settlement. The faction leaders and other leaders from international groups were invited to meet for reconciliation. This eventually led to a ceasefire agreement, as well as further secure humanitarian assistance from the UN. Later, Resolution 746 was passed in 1992 by the Security Council, sending a team to Somalia to monitor the ceasefire agreement and plan for continued humanitarian aid.

UNOSOM (the United Nations Operation in Somalia) was later established by Resolution 751. 500 UN personnel were sent to monitor the cease fire. Over time, more and more aid was received in Somalia, and extensive negotiations took place with faction leaders, with many calling for action in the Security Council and UNOSOM increased activity. Larger units of soldiers were sent to keep peace.

Groups such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO), and in 1992, 30 NGOs took initiative in bringing food and other services to the civilians. The 100-Day Programme began, as people worked to bring food, basic health services, immunization, water, sanitation, hygiene, tools, rehabilitation, and many others.

However, in 1991 Somalia was still without a central government, and negotiations failed. Multiple factions ruled the country, bringing political chaos and physical destruction. Humanitarian aid was strained, prevented, and stolen by factions. Resolution 794 was implemented, where all necessary means would be deployed to bring Somalia to secure aid. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) came into play and was very successful, quickly helping the desperate situation.

A national reconciliation meeting took place with 14 faction leaders and other international heads of society. An agreement was made in which ceasefire would follow and a committee would be created to facilitate national reconciliation. Eventually the Security Council also adopted Resolution 814 to enlarge UNOSOM II. These operations later stopped in 1993 as little progress was being made.

The United Nations continues to aid the people of Somalia. In 2016, UN Resolutions on Countering Terrorism and Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism have been passed in order to prevent extremism. In 2016, the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism was also launched, which focused on conflict prevention, human rights, gender equality, education, communication, and youth. The UN's goal is to limit terrorist groups and their impact on the people and country. The UN plays a major role in providing both information, guidance, order,

and coordination in helping Somalia reach this goal. In 2017, Resolution 2358 gave the United Nations the power to help Somalia in their systematic implementation of the National Strategy and Action Plan to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism. In addition, the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) has also been established to help the government of Somalia protect itself and its people. It also has dedicated programs for rehabilitation, economic aid, and education.

Overall, the main concern and goal of the UN is to provide humanitarian aid, restore the political system, cease the violence, relieve the economy, and bring Somalia and its people to stability and peace.

III. Blocs Positions

Western Bloc:

Though the Western bloc has made many efforts to combat the actions of al-Shabaab, the terrorist group's recruitment of Western operatives, primarily through the Internet, heightens the organization's threats towards the bloc. In late 2009, over twenty Somali-Americans disappeared from Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, and Toronto. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Michael Leiter, reported to Congress that the targeted Americans and Canadians were put through terrorist training, conducted by al-Qaeda, and that seven had been killed in combat. Despite these recruitments, the Western Bloc continues sending service members to work with Somali citizens and Kenyan soldiers, and dispatching troops to advise the local forces. Continuing and adding to this process has the potential to aid the nullification of the issue.

Latin American and Caribbean Bloc:

Many countries in the Latin American and Caribbean bloc have been directly aiding the terrorist organizations in Somalia, including Al-Shabaab. Especially, Venezuela and Cuba. Venezuela's vice president, Tareck El Aissami, was a prominent figure in the international drug trade, and directly supplied large cartels of drugs to Somalian terrorists, which fund terrorist operation and arms. The Tri-Border of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay is a hotspot for Somalian terrorists, who often come here to finance their operations in Somalia. The Latin American bloc must work together to prevent terrorists from using their land to commit mass killings in Somalia. In particular, this bloc will have to work on domestic security and reducing the drug trade throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.

African Bloc:

Since Somalia is in Africa, the African Bloc is especially involved in this topic, as a lot of the fighting going on within Somalia often spill over to neighboring countries, and many of the terrorists of Al-Shabaab use the neighboring African countries to hide away after their attacks, and/or to finance their future attacks within Somalia through the drug trade. The failed states and weak police forces of many of these neighboring countries provide a safe haven for these terrorists to hide out and finance their attack schemes, with little fear of any repercussions for doing so. In order to help solve this conflict, these African countries must stand united and work together to eliminate these safe havens for Somalian terrorists from their countries.

Eastern European Bloc:

The EU has been the main funder of AMISOM, an active peacekeeping mission to Somalia which had been initiated in 2007, funding over 90% of the mission's budget over the last 8 years. AMISOM, or the African Union Mission in Somalia, has been a major force fighting back against the Somali terrorist forces. However, in this year, they have cut funding to 80%, and there are plans to cut it down even further. Without the strength of AMISOM, Somali terrorism would quickly proliferate all over Somalia, and can even spread to many neighboring countries. In order to fight the forces of Al-Shabab, Eastern Europe needs to continue putting in its standard funding to AMISOM, if not more. In addition, some of the drug trade owned by Somali terrorists extends through Southern Eastern Europe, which directly helps to fund the terrorist activities of Al-Shabab. By monitoring the drug trade and restrictions within Eastern Europe, and through the continued funding of AMISOM, the Eastern Europe can make a large difference in combating terrorism in Somalia.

Asia-Pacific Bloc:

Although this bloc isn't very involved in the terrorism occurring in Somalia, it can still help through a multitude of ways. For example, many of these countries can provide an increased funding for AMISOM, in order to help directly fight Somali terrorism through peacekeeping forces. In addition, these countries can employ stricter drug trade laws within their own countries that help prevent the Somali drug trade from having too much of an influence. Due to the fact that many of these countries are fairly wealthy, financial assistance for this crisis would be the best option for this bloc to help fight terrorism in Somalia.

IV. Solutions

In terms of finding solutions for the reduction of terrorism in Somalia, it is important to recognize that Somalia's national security, public institutions, and political processes remain corrupt. It is equally as crucial to tackle the lack of efficient security forces. The president of Somalia, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, needs to prioritize the search for political settlement with the armed terrorist groups. The media also needs to cover the terrorist attacks so the international community can be aware of what is occurring. Also, a long term solution is to improve border security in countries with high terrorist attack percentages to ensure that threats are not entering the country illegally. In addition to security, guards in the nation's' borders cannot be susceptible to bribes and illegal behavior. Seeing as how different countries may have various capacities and priorities for preventing terrorism, delegates must consider the most effective means for their country.

V. Questions to Consider

1. What is the main cause of terrorism in Somalia?
2. What areas in Somalia are affected the most by terrorism?
3. How does terrorism in Somalia impact other countries and their security?
4. How can the safety of Somalian citizen be assured?
5. What are some non-profit organizations that Somalia has worked with in the past or can work with in the future?
6. What solutions already implemented in Somalia have worked to some degree and which have not?
7. What steps can be taken to ensure humanitarian aid can reach the Somali citizens?

8. What are some developing countries that were successful in preventing terrorism and how did they do it?
9. What incentives can be given in order to promote security and safety in Somalia?

Works Cited

1. Jones, et al. "Al Shabaab Is Weakened but Not Defeated in Somalia." *RAND Corporation*, 13 Sept. 2016, www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html.
2. "Military, Political Strategy Vital to Addressing Terrorist Threat in Somalia, Special Representative Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." *United Nations*, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13175.doc.htm.
3. "Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism." *UNSOM*, 19 Nov. 2017, unsom.unmissions.org/prevention-and-countering-violent-extremism.
4. "Security Council Press Statement on Somalia | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases." *United Nations*, United Nations, www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13223.doc.htm.
5. Suruma, Ezra, and John Mutenyo. "Terror in Uganda: The World Must Do More in Somalia." *Brookings*, Brookings, 28 July 2016, www.brookings.edu/opinions/terror-in-uganda-the-world-must-do-more-in-somalia/
6. "Terrorism Havens: Somalia." *Council on Foreign Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations,

www.cfr.org/background/terrorism-havens-somalia.

7. “UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background (Full Text).” *United Nations*, United Nations,
www.peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html.
8. “UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA I (UNOSOM I) - Background (Full Text).” *United Nations*, United Nations,
peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unosom1backgr2.html.
9. “Who Are Somalia's Al-Shabab?” *BBC News*, BBC, 22 Dec. 2017,
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689.